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Abstract The German parliament in the Weimar Republic was very instable and govern-
ments did not last long. Historical research has tried to determine what caused this insta-
bility. Those historical hypotheses are re-examined by studying a completely new dataset
covering 489 roll-call-bills in the parliament during the 14 years in question. According to
the findings of this study it is very unlikely that it was only the system, its conditions and its
actors that caused instability and that the reasons rather have to be found outside parliament.




On the European continent, the interwar period was not a good time for democracy: re-
publics were failing virtually everywhere from Spain to Estonia and from Italy to Poland.
However, without any doubt the Weimar Republic (1919–1933) is the most famous and most
important such case. After all, it was in Germany that the breakdown of democracy brought
a regime to power that plunged the world into the most terrible war it had ever seen, that
practiced genocide on an industrial scale and that undermined the very fundament of civ-
ilization, in a country that had prided itself on being one of the most cultured of Europe.
Explaining how the 1933 events could happen has been a major challenge to research ever
since.
The present paper analyses one aspect of the weakness of the Weimar Republic: the short
life span of its governments. There were five general elections, that is, one every two and
a half years, with on average no administration lasting longer than eight months in office.
Altogether, the Republic had 18 governments, 14 of which took office before 1930, when the
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president decided to dispense with the parliament and to govern by decree,1 thus initiating
the final phase of the republic’s life. The question this study sets out to answer is: why
were the Weimar governments so unstable? In fact, there are only two possibilities: either
the cause of instability lay within the parliament, the ‘Reichstag’, or it came from outside.
Accordingly, I will investigate whether it was parliamentary weakness and dysfunctionality
that caused the frequent changes in government, or whether other factors, not linked to the
efficiency of the parliament, are to blame.
This study is based on a total of 489 reported parliamentary roll-call votes from the time
between 1920 and 1933. These bills are used as a sample in order to study the behavior of
politicians in the parliament of the first German democracy. By studying this new database,
which has not been analysed before, it is possible to improve upon the recent historical and
political science literature and to increase our knowledge about the Weimar Republic. In
particular, we can test a large number of hypotheses advanced in order to explain the lack of
political stability from which the Republic suffered.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section of the introduction,
I discuss what research hitherto has been. This is necessary because all research questions
I ask in order to solve the general problem, which is considered in this article, are based
on hypotheses advanced in the literature. These hypotheses are tested with the help of my
data, which I introduce in the last part of the introduction. Section 2 of this study concerns
the analysis. Here, I first introduce a number of core concepts, such as the question of what
defines an efficient government and the assumption that parties and party factions in par-
liament can be treated as unitary actors. Then, I consider the general functionality of the
parliament, i.e., questions related to the factors that determined the success of parties and
to the formation of coalitions. Finally, I turn to factors that may have weakened parliament
from within, thus causing governmental instability, and to potentially disruptive influences
from outside. Section 3 concludes and summarises my findings.
1.2 Previous work and hypotheses
In order to answer the question of whether the instability of the Weimar Republic was due to
factors from inside or outside parliament, it is helpful to begin by considering a number of
more general issues. During the lifetime of the Republic, no party ever managed to achieve
an absolute majority either in votes during general elections or in seats within parliament. All
governments therefore had to be based on coalitions between several parties. Hence, before
considering any potentially disruptive influences, I need to analyse the formation of formal
and informal coalitions and the factors that were of importance here. In this context, the
historical literature is not very helpful. Descriptions of how the government coalitions of the
Weimar Republic were set up can, of course, be found in any account of the political history
of interwar Germany, but systematic analyses are lacking. Table 1 provides an overview of
the different governing coalitions, their power in seats and their duration in days.
While the historical literature is unhelpful, in the political science literature two compet-
ing systematic explanations of coalition formation have been advanced. The first approach
sees coalitions as primarily driven by the desire to be on the winning side. In this view,
any actor can coalesce with any other actor, regardless of the distance between their policy
preferences. Baron and Ferejohn (1989), for example, assume that legislators are willing to
exchange votes with any other legislator in order to secure their preferred policy outcomes
1The president had the right to ignore the parliament and rule the country on his own, applying article 48 of
the constitution (Kolb 2002, p. 18).
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Table 1 Overview of governments
Day of nomination Chancellor Coalition Share of seats Duration
in days
2/13/1919 Scheidemann (SPD) SPD, Center, DDP 78.1 128
6/21/1919 Bauer (SPD) SPD, Center 60.3 279
3/27/1920 Müller (SPD) SPD, Center, DDP 78.1 90
6/25/1920 Fehrenbach (Center) Center, DVP, DDP 36.6 319
5/10/1921 Wirth (Center) SPD, Center, DDP 44.6 561
11/22/1922 Cuno Center, DVP, DDP, BVP 41.2 264
8/13/1923 Stresemann (DVP) SPD, DDP, Center, DVP 58.8 109
11/30/1923 Marx (Center) DVP, Center, DDP 36.6 185
06/03/1924 Marx (Center) Center, DVP, DDP 29.2 226
01/15/1925 Luther Center, DVP, DDP, BVP,
DNVP 55.5 370
01/20/1926 Luther Center, DDP, DVP, BVP 34.7 115
05/16/1926 Marx (Center) Center, DVP, DDP, BVP 34.7 258
01/29/1927 Marx (Center) Center, BVP, DVP, DNVP 49.1 515
06/28/1928 Müller (SPD) SPD, Center, BVP, DDP,
DVP 61.5 581
03/30/1930 Brüning (Center) Presidential 558
10/09/1931 Brüning (Center) Presidential 235
01/06/1932 v. Papen (Center) Presidential 186
12/04/1932 v. Schleicher Presidential 58
01/30/1933 Hitler (NSDAP) NSDAP, DNVP 42.5
Source: (Falter et al. 1986). KPD = German Communist Party; USPD = Independent Social Democrats;
SPD = Social Democrats; DDP = German Democratic Party; Center = Center Party; BVP = Bavarian Peo-
ple’s Party; DVP = German People’s Party; DNVP = German Nationalist People’s Party; NSDAP = National
Socialists
on the issues they care about most. Also, if a party is decisive in turning a losing coalition
into a winning one, it can demand a high price for participating in this coalition. Hence, the
more likely it is that an actor is pivotal, the more power this actor will have in coalition bar-
gaining. In the context of the parliament of the Weimar Republic, this approach predicts that
relative party group size, rather than the party groups’ policy preferences, is the main deter-
minant of coalition formation. Since I will investigate only the informal coalition formation
between two parties and two parties never managed to reach the majority alone, group size
can be ignored as a determinant of the probability that tow parts vote together.
By contrast, the second approach assumes that policy preferences drive coalition forma-
tion between two parties. In this view, a legislator is more likely to vote with someone whose
preference is closer to his own than with someone further away (Axelrod 1970). The theory
thus suggests that in explaining coalition formation in Weimar Germany, we need to look
at measures of ideological distance between party groups as well as measures of the size of
groups forming the coalition. The data set used here allows me to test both hypotheses, my
first research question being therefore whether coalition formation was driven by ideology.
In addition to the problem of coalition formation, there is another issue which I need
to consider, i.e., party success pure and simple. One major aspect in this context is how
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the ideological position of a party and its size determines party success. Krehbiel (1991),
for instance, emphasises the role of the legislative median2 in shaping policy outcomes. In
my context, I therefore need to discover the position of this median, and to determine how
successful the party that represented the median was in terms of votes taken in parliament.
Accordingly, I ask a second research question: was the median legislator really crucially
important to shaping policies in the parliament of the Weimar Republic?
Having dealt with these background issues, we can turn to the core problem on which
this article is focused, i.e., to the question of whether the Weimar parliament was inherently
dysfunctional or whether outside influences caused governmental instability. A number of
hypotheses have been advanced in the historical literature. In fact, there is a broad strand
of historical research that explains the downfall of democracy in Germany by pointing to
what scholars perceived as the weakness of the Republic’s parliament. Checking whether the
Reichstag really was that inefficient is valuable in itself: after all, this line of research may in-
advertently have fallen prey to the anti-democratic propaganda of the 1920s as 1930s, when
right-wing polemicists used to disparage the parliament as highly ineffectual, as a ‘talking
shop’ or ‘higher-order beer hall’. It was easy to believe the propaganda as Sontheimer points
out: “The pages of antidemocratic publications contained much unjust and unfair criticism.
However, where this aimed at parliamentarism, the parliamentary hustle and bustle of the
Weimar period itself gave it some justification. The parliamentarism of the Weimar Republic
was ill; so ill, indeed, that it never recovered from its malady, which had been evident early
on, and that eventually it succumbed to this disease” (Sontheimer 1978: p. 149).
As my research takes the hypotheses advanced by historians who argue that the Reichstag
was weak and chaotic as a starting point, it is useful to take a closer look at them.
To begin with, Hermens (1951), Falter et al. (1986) and others have suggested that the
electoral law was the source of instability in the Weimar Republic, because it allowed a large
number of small parties to enter parliament. Given the resulting high levels of fragmentation,
it was allegedly very difficult to build a stable majority. The present German constitution re-
flects this view. Today, a party needs at least 5% of all votes to enter parliament. This hurdle
was introduced to keep the number of parties low and protect the parliament from coalition
formation problems caused by too many small parties, such as those that had arisen in the
Weimar Republic. It is difficult, however, to demonstrate whether a hypothetical 5% hurdle
would have improved the situation in parliament. Table 2 shows that until the elections in
May of 1928 small parties did not hold more than 6% of the seats altogether.
In the years between 1928 and 1932, small parties had quite a large influence, but then
they almost completely disappeared. With the above information in mind, the third ques-
tion this paper asks is, to what extent did the large number of small parties undermine the
governing coalition?
In contrast to the view just discussed, historians such as Fenske (1972), Knütter (1998)
and Peukert (1987) argue that the dominance of extremist parties made it impossible to
build a stable democratic parliament. The extremist parties in question are the Communists
(KPD) on the left side of the spectrum and the German National People’s Party (DNVP) and
National Socialists (NSDAP) on the right. Allegedly, other parties did not want to cooperate
2In this context, the definition ‘median’ does not refer to the votes of the electorate, but to every voter in
the parliament, i.e., to the MPs (therefore ‘median legislator’). When the parties are aligned on the left-right
continuum, the median legislator is a member of the party whose cumulative proportion in terms of seats that
the party won in general elections was more than 0.50. After every election the median voter is a member
of the Center party. Furthermore it is important to note than the turnout for each bill does not change the
proportions. The median voter is a member of the Center party in every roll-call vote.
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Table 2 Distribution of seats in percent after general elections
Parties June May Dec. May Sep. July Nov. March
1920 1924 1924 1928 1930 1932 1932 1933
KPD 0.80 13.10 9.10 11.00 13.30 14.60 17.30 12.50
USPD 18.30
SPD 22.20 21.20 26.60 31.20 24.80 21.90 20.90 18.60
DDP 8.50 5.90 6.50 5.10 3.50 0.70 0.35 0.80
Center 13.90 13.80 14.00 12.40 11.80 12.30 12.10 11.40
BVP 4.60 3.40 3.90 3.50 3.30 3.60 3.45 2.80
DVP 14.20 9.50 10.30 9.20 5.20 1.20 1.90 0.30
DNVP 15.50 20.10 20.90 14.90 7.10 6.10 8.90 8.00
NSDAP 6.80 2.80 2.40 18.50 37.80 33.80 44.51
Small parties 1.96 6.10 5.90 10.40 12.50 1.81 1.20 1.08
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: (Falter et al. 1986)
with the extremist ones, which were just interested in staying in opposition, from where
they could easily sabotage the democratic system. Nevertheless, extremist parties constantly
gained seats (see Table 2). The KPD started off with less than 1% in June 1920 and ended
with 12.5% of seats after the last election. The National Socialists started off with 6.8 and
ended with 44.5% of the seats after the final election in March 1933. Consequently, the
fourth question I ask is: to what extent did extremist parties influence the decision-making
process in parliament?
While this literature has focused on the parliament and parliamentarians, another line
of historical research focuses more on external factors. This strand has a long tradition that
goes back to views held by contemporaries. For example, Otto Braun (1949), prime minister
of Prussia (1920–1932), claimed in his autobiography that Hitler was able to make his way
because of ‘Moscow and Versailles’. With ‘Moscow’ he alluded to the influence of the KPD,
which during the 1920s increasingly came under the control of Stalin (he thus anticipated
the hypothesis which explains the instability of Weimar with the influence of extremist par-
ties). With ‘Versailles’ Braun referred to the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.
According to him, the terms of the treaty made it impossible for the Weimar governments to
deal with economic pressures, thus allowing Hitler to mobilise the frustrated population for
his party. Ritschl (2002) recently formulated this hypothesis more explicitly. He suggested
that politicians had no real chance to build a stable and functioning democracy because they
were trapped in a double ‘principal-agent’ problem. This problem was due to the fact that,
like all democracies, that of Weimar was based on the principle that all public authority de-
rives from the people. In democracies, power is to be exercised by the people in elections
and plebiscites through special legislative, executive and judicial institutions. In other words:
politicians act as the agents of voters. Therefore, politicians, or more precisely the coalitions
they form, and the population both are faced with typical principal-agent problems, such
as information asymmetries, moral hazard and the self-interest of agents. However, in the
Weimar Republic there was one additional important feature: politicians had a second prin-
cipal, namely the Allies. Of course, the Allies did not select politicians, but they tried to
control and influence their decisions. They had a very strong position, because Germany
did not capitulate until it was completely unable to continue fighting and had no power left
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to negotiate seriously. Furthermore, at the end of the war there was no powerful neutral
party left that was able to control peace negotiations and thereby temper the requirements
of the winners. Peace negotiations were just between winners. They provided a statement
of requirements that Germany had to accept.3 German politicians were not able to fulfil the
conflicting demands of both principals. For example, if they paid the reparations in time,
they had a very limited budget to finance programs to reduce unemployment in order to
satisfy the demand of the population.
Another consideration refers to economic conditions. The Weimar Republic experienced
periods of extreme economic turmoil, notably in the early 1920s and during the World Eco-
nomic Crisis 1929–1933. It is well known that such conditions, in particular unemployment,
influenced voting decisions in favour of extremist parties in general election (Stogbauer
2001), and it could be possible that it also had direct effects on voting behavior in the
Reichstag between general elections. All these considerations lead me to a fifth and final
research question: did external conditions, notably the conflict with the allies and the rise
of unemployment, have a significant negative impact on agreement and stability within the
parliament?
1.3 The data
The data that I am using were taken from the official protocols of the parliament, the ‘Reich-
stagsprotokolle’, from 1920 to 1933. It is not possible to calculate exactly how representative
the roll-call votes were of all votes, since the total number of votes is not reported separately.
I am aware of the problems involved in drawing general conclusions about legislative be-
havior based on a sample which might not reflect the behavior in all parliamentary debates
(Carrubba et al. 2006). However, the reported roll-call votes in the Weimar Republic include
all important votes of that period, such as votes on the London Ultimate and the Treaty of
Versailles. They also include bills about less important issues, and took place frequently.
Thus, from a qualitative point of view, the roll-call bills surely seem to be a representative
sample of parliamentary decisions.
The data cover all votes published by name, with the exception of those votes that were
held to make sure that enough members of the parliament were present to constitute a quo-
rum. Roll-call votes were held when at least 50 members of the parliament demanded it (oth-
erwise votes were anonymous). The number of members of parliaments varied because it
was dependent on the total turnout. In 1919, 421 politicians were in the parliament, whereas
in 1933 there were 647 seats. Furthermore, roll-call votes had to concern topics of minimum
importance (§106 standing order of the parliament, Geschäftsordnung 1922).
As shown in Table 3, bills can be classified into eight categories, where the ‘Enabling
Act’ (Ermächtigungsgesetz) includes all bills concerning paragraph 48 of the Weimar con-
stitution, with which the president was allowed to make certain decisions without the ap-
proval of parliament. These bills were requests for the lifting of the Enabling Act. ‘Pub-
lic Finances’ includes bills about fiscal matters; ‘Labor’ includes all bills concerning labor
regulations like unemployment insurance, minimum wages and so forth. ‘Tax’ covers bills
about tax laws, for example property and sales taxes, and ‘Trade’ includes bills about tariffs
and export and import regulations. ‘Trust’ includes ‘votes of no confidence’ and ‘votes of
confidence’. During the 13 years under consideration, 60 bills concerned the relationship
between government and parliament, which indicates how insecure and unstable the gov-
ernments were. ‘Versailles’ includes all bills concerning the Treaty of Versailles, but also all
3Moreover, allied politicians also had their principals, that is, their populations, who claimed compensations.
Public Choice (2010) 144: 83–104 89
Table 3 Overview of voting
topics
Source: calculated by author
Frequency In percent
Enabling Act 23 4.70








subsequent treaties or proposals concerning reparations, such as the Young Plan. ‘Others’
include all bills that do not fit into any of the other categories.
2 Analysis
2.1 Core concepts: government efficiency and party factions as unitary actors
All questions considered in this paper focus on possible forces that might have disturbed
the efficiency of government. Thus, in order to answer them, it is necessary to first define
government efficiency and then, in a second step, to investigate if and under what conditions
the particular forces outlined above had a disturbing effect.
Governments are supposed to lead the parliament and to determine policy. A functioning
government is defined as one which wins bills. A ‘won’ bill is in turn defined as a bill passed
by a vote where the majority of the members of the governing coalition voted in line with
the result of the vote. For example, if 70% of the governing coalition voted ‘yes’ in a vote
on introducing law y and altogether more than 50% of the parliament members voted ‘yes’
and law ‘y’ passes, this would be counted as a ‘won bill’ for the governing coalition, which
indicates a functioning government.
In order to win a bill, the governing coalition needs to behave as homogeneously as
possible. A second criterion for a functioning government, therefore, is that there should
be agreement within the governing coalition, which can be measured with the following
‘Agreement Index’ (AI) (Hix et al. 2005):
AIi = max(Yi,Ni,Ai) − 0.5[(Yi + Ni + Ai) − max(Yi,Ni,Ai)]
(Yi + Ni + Ai)
where Yi denotes the number of ‘Yes’ votes expressed by the governing coalition on a given
vote, ‘Ni ’ the number of ‘No’ votes and Ai the number of ‘Abstain’ votes. As a result, AI
equals one when all members of the coalition vote together, and zero when the members of
a party are equally distributed among all three of these voting options.
Table 4 provides the agreement index and the percentage share of won votes for the
governing coalitions over time. Given the strong positive correlation between the importance
of a vote and the total turnout, roll-call votes are weighted by turnout. This eliminates the
variability of agreement resulting from the varying importance of bills. Coalition coherence
90 Public Choice (2010) 144: 83–104
Table 4 Measures for the “functionality” of the government
All RT1 RT2 RT3 RT4 RT5 RT6
June June Jan. June Oct. Aug.
1920– 1924– 1924– 1928– 1930– 1932–
May 1924 Dec. 1924 May 1928 Sept. 1930 July 1932 Nov. 1932
AI 0.77 0.79 0.93 0.71 0.90 0.73
(st. dev. in (0.29) (0.21) (0.19) (0.24) (0.16) (0.43)
parentheses)
Percentage 0.84 0.70 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.93
share of votes
won
Number of 489 80 11 158 134 99 6
bills
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: for the sixth Reichstag (Aug.–Nov. 1932), no AI has been calculated
because during this legislative period, the President governed by decree
was variable between the different parliamentary periods and was at its lowest in the third
period and in the last period before the president took over. The governing coalitions won
most of the votes over the entire period—on average 84% of the roll-call votes. Only in the
first parliament was the number of won votes quite low, at 70%.
The analysis of roll-call votes allows not just the observation of party groups, but also
of individual voting behavior. The parliament of the Weimar Republic, however, shows a
very high degree of party discipline, i.e., very little volatility in individual voting behavior.
The term ‘Fraktionszwang’, which describes the obligation of a party member to vote in
accordance with party policy, was coined in that era (Bracher 1984: 73). Table 5 shows the
average agreement index, defined above, for each single party, again weighted by turnout
as in Table 4. The descriptive statistics show that all parties voted almost completely ho-
mogeneously. The Independent Social Democrats (USPD) had the lowest average AI with
89 in total, whereas the Social Democrats (SPD) were the most cohesive party. All parties
became increasingly cohesive in the last two parliamentary periods. The ‘Fraktionszwang’
was strong, and parties can therefore undoubtedly be treated as single actors in the following
analysis.
2.2 Influence of ideology and party position
As discussed above, there are two competing explanations of inter-party competition and
coalition formation. The first approach sees coalition as primarily driven by the desire to be
on the winning side. In the context of the parliament of the Weimar Republic, this hypoth-
esis predicts that relative party group size, rather than the party groups’ policy preferences,
is the main determinant of coalition formation. Since here I focus on informal coalitions
between two party pairs, and as two parties in the Weimar Republic never managed to get
a majority, the variable size as a driving factor for coalition formation can be ignored. It
matters, however, for the formal coalitions which are analysed when I test whether small
or extremist parties had an influence on the behavior of the formal coalition, i.e., the gov-
ernment. I therefore test whether or to what extent the size of a group matters for coalition
formation. The second approach assumes that policy preferences drive coalition formation.
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Table 5 Measure of homogeneity by AI for all parties
All RT1 RT2 RT3 RT4 RT5 RT6
June June Jan. June Oct. Aug.
1920– 1924– 1924– 1928– 1930– 1932–
May 1924 Dec. 1924 May 1928 Sept. 1930 July 1932 Nov. 1932
KPD 0.97 0.96 0.944 1 0.99 1
(0.07) (0.018) (0.10) (0) (0.05) (0)
USPD 0.89 0.89
(0.18) (0.18)
SPD 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.27) (0.018) (0.009) (0.042) (0.001) (0.01) (0.005)
DDP 0.90 0.89 0.97 0.86 0.96
(0.17) (0.18) (0.057) (0.19) (0.13)
Center 0.94 0.94 1 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.98
(0.13) (0.11) (0) (0.14) (0.166) (0.11) (0.038)
BVP 0.94 0.89 1 0.94 0.93 0.98 1
(0.13) (0.18) (0) (0.13) (0.14) (0.075) (0)
DVP 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.98
(0.10) (0.12) (0.012) (0.087) (0.14) (0.04)
DNVP 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.99 1
(0.12) (0.11) (0.007) (0.09) (0.17) (0.009) (0)
NSDAP 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.99 1 1
(0.09) (0.015) (0.13) (0.016) (0) (0)
Number of 489 80 11 158 134 99 6
bills
Source: Author’s calculation
KPD USPD SPD DDP Center BVP DVP DNVP NSDAP
Left Right
Source: de Swaan (1973)
Fig. 1 Left-right continuum
This theory suggests that we need to look at measures of ideological distance between party
groups, as well as at measures of the size of groups forming the coalition.
Ideological closeness is defined as closeness on the left-right continuum introduced
below. The political scientist de Swaan (1973) provides such a continuum for Germany
(Fig. 1), which is consistent with Downs’s (1957) model.
The political science literature provides many other methodological approaches to esti-
mating party positions. Methods range from Laver and Garry’s (2000) ‘computerized con-
tent analysis’ approach over the ‘party-manifesto-based approach’ by Budge et al. (2001)
and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to the ‘expert survey analysis’ by Benoit and
Laver (2006). However, these techniques require a sufficient number of party manifestos for
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Table 6 Coalitions: proportion of times the party groups voted together
Left wing Left-right continuum Right wing
KPD USPD SPD DDP Center BVP DVP DNVP NSDAP
Reichstag 1 (RT1 80 bills)
USPD 0.77 0.40 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.22
SPD 0.47 0.51 0.43 0.38 0.32
DDP 0.76 0.65 0.68 0.52




Reichstag 2 (RT2 11 bills)
KPD 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.54 0.50
SPD 0.81 0.63 0.81 0.81 0.09 0.20
DDP 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.27 0.40
Center 0.81 0.81 0.45 0.60
BVP 1.00 0.27 0.40
DVP 0.27 0.40
DNVP 0.90
Reichstag 3 (RT3 158 bills)
KPD 0.83 0.59 0.14 0.17 0.97 0.17 0.60
SPD 0.70 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.54
DDP 0.49 0.45 0.47 0.34 0.44
Center 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.38
BVP 0.87 0.84 0.42
DVP 0.87 0.40
DNVP 0.47
all parties, preferably over time. Parties of the Weimar Republic did not regularly publish
manifestos. For the KPD, for instance, just one official text is available, published in 1930
(Treue 1956). Most of the party propaganda, advertisement and acquisition of voters were
oral or pamphlet form.
An alternative approach that does not require the analysis of party programmes infers
policy position from the politicians’ voting patterns. This method is called NOMINATE.
NOMINATE’s theoretical grounding lies in the spatial theory of voting, whereby MPs are
assumed to have single-peaked preferences over an n-dimensional space, which is the task
of the NOMINATE method itself to identify. NOMINATE calculates the ‘revealed’ position
of each MP based on an alternating three-step algorithm using roll call votes (Poole and
Rosenthal 1985). For this study, the data on roll-call votes are aggregated by party and
not by individuals. Expanding the database by looking at the votes of every individual and
estimating party positions using the NOMINATE method is left to future research. However,
as shown above, individuals voted overwhelmingly in party line and the approach used here
captures the most important voting behavior patterns.
Moreover, the left-right continuum I apply to the Weimar Republic is commonly used.
De Swaan (1973), for instance, applied the same measure in order to test his coalition theory
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Table 6 (Continued)
Left wing Left-right continuum Right wing
KPD USPD SPD DDP Center BVP DVP DNVP NSDAP
Reichstag 4 (RT4 134 bills)
KPD 0.40 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.41 0.74
SPD 0.68 0.64 0.52 0.61 0.15 0.24
DDP 0.92 0.79 0.91 0.41 0.17
Center 0.79 0.90 0.47 0.21
BVP 0.78 0.48 0.27
DVP 0.47 0.20
DNVP 0.62
Reichstag 5 (RT5 99 bills)
KPD 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.43 0.88
SPD 0.82 0.80 0.74 0.14 0.11
Center 0.95 0.88 0.13 0.11
BVP 0.88 0.14 0.13
DVP 0.22 0.26
DNVP 0.77
Reichstag 6 (RT6 bills)
KPD 0.83 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.16
SPD 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.16 0.33
Center 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.66
BVP 0.00 0.33 0.66
DVP 0.66 0.00
DNVP 0.16
Source: calculated by author
for Germany. Based on this left-right continuum, I test whether political closeness between
two parties increased the probability that they voted in the same way.
Table 6 shows the informal coalitions. Political closeness does indeed seem to have in-
fluenced voting behavior. Informal coalition patterns followed the left-right dimension for
the first Reichstag. For instance it was more likely that the German Democratic Party (DDP)
voted with the Center (76% of all bills) than with the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) (only
65% of all bills) and so forth. The governing coalition consisting of DDP, Center and DVP
voted on average the same way in about 70% of the bills. The second Reichstag shows some
deviation from the simple left-right continuum: Communists were more likely to vote like
the extreme right than like the moderate left-wing parties, and other parties to the left of
the center were also less likely to vote like the Center than like the DVP and DNVP. The
third Reichstag followed the left-right continuum for the center right, but the Communists
still voted with the National Socialists. Center, BVP and DVP improved their coalition co-
herence by now voting similarly in about 90% of all bills. The fourth and fifth Reichstag
again show voting patterns on the left-right dimension for most parties. This voting behav-
ior of extremist parties is not surprising as both the KPD and the National Socialist were
primarily interested in destroying democracy. Altogether, descriptive statistics suggest that
political closeness mattered for voting decisions, i.e., that political actors were not ‘policy-
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Table 7 Variable distance for party pairs
Distance Party pairs
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blind’. The closer parties were on the left-right continuum, the more likely they were to vote
together.
In order to test the influence of other variables, I use a simple econometric model, first
doing a cross-sectional analysis for the whole period and then running the regressions sepa-
rately for the three different time periods. Ideological closeness is captured by a dependent
variable which I term INFORMAL COALITION, and which is the agreement index as de-
scribed above, calculated for every pair of parties treated as one group. This creates a total of
36 pairs and 17604 observations. Unlike standard ordinary least squares models, the depen-
dent variable is censored on both sides: the lowest value is zero and the highest value is one.
It will therefore be estimated applying a simple Tobit model (see Johnston and Dindardo
1997).
For the independent variables, I use an ordinally scaled variable ‘Distance’ to measure
ideological closeness. Distance is equal to one if parties are next to each other on the left-
right continuum, equal to 2 if there is another party in between and so forth. Distance, for
instance, is equal to one for the party pairs: KPD and USPD, USPD and SPD, SPD and DDP
and so forth, which means that those parties are neighbors on the left-right continuum (see
Table 7).
To control for the effect of fixed coalition agreements, I include a dummy variable that is
equal to one if both parties were in the government (Govdummy). I further include dummies
that control for certain topics.
Table 8 shows the regression results for INFORMAL COALITION, which is the agree-
ment index of two party pairs. The first regression includes all bills. Here, the government
dummy is positive and significant. Coalition agreements and higher pressure for parties in
the government to find suitable solutions made them coalesce with higher probability than
parties that were not in the government. However, breaking down the bills into three time
periods shows quite a different picture. The first period (regression 2) begins in 1919 and
ends in 1923, which were the years when democracy was still developing. The second pe-
riod, between 1924 and 1929 (regression 3), was a phase of relative stability, and the third
period, between 1930 and 1933 (regression 4), saw the decline and fall of the democracy.
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Table 8 Regression results for INFORMAL COALITION (AI_coalition) between party pairs (Tobit model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time periods Whole time period 1919–1923 1924–1929 1930–1933
Dependent variable Agreement coalitions
Govdummy = 1 if party was in the 0.071 −0.083 −0.020 0.256
government (8.77)** (3.19)** (2.05)* (15.03)**
Distance −0.036 −0.013 −0.049 −0.049
(18.96)** (3.04)** (21.42)** (11.28)**
Enabling Act 0.074 0.089 0.001
(4.46)** (3.22)** (0.03)
Public Finances 0.064 0.023 − 0.013 0.151
(6.25)** (0.99) (0.92) (7.27)**
Labour −0.082 −0.161 −0.049
(6.91)** (2.57)* (4.36)**
Tax −0.052 0.148 −0.049 −0.112
(5.33)** (5.12)** (4.49)** (4.37)**
Trade 0.028 −0.005 0.035 0.008
(2.05)* (0.17) (1.70) (0.35)
Trust 0.010 −0.026 −0.003 0.049
(0.92) (0.90) (0.22) (2.09)*
Versailles −0.060 −0.099 −0.008 −0.124
(4.79)** (3.29)** (0.53) (4.67)**
Constant 0.973 0.876 0.992 1.020
(116.75)** (49.83)** (96.52)** (51.28)**
R-squared 0.055 0.018 0.078 0.14
Observations 13497 2720 6732 4045
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses *significant at 5% **significant at 1%
The separate analysis of these periods shows that parties, which were in the government
between 1919 and 1929, were less likely to agree with each other than parties generally.
Controlling for ideological distance, being in government together only had a positive influ-
ence on coalition formation in the last three years of the Weimar Republic. In sharp contrast,
ideological influence had a strong influence on the probability of parties voting together and
this effect was stable across time. The coefficient is highly significant and negative. Thus,
the further apart two parties were on the left-right continuum, the less likely it was that they
would vote together. Apparently, parties did vote ideologically.
In the next step, I study how successful the parties were and what determined their suc-
cess. If parties are ordered on the left-right continuum, the median legislator is a member of
the Center party, which therefore should win most of the votes. The farther away a party is
from the median legislator, the less likely is it expected to have won a vote.
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics, for each parliament, for the percentage share of
‘won votes’ for all parties. Neither KPD nor NSDAP managed to win more than about 20%
of all votes before the 6th Reichstag, although the Communists often voted like the National
Socialists. Over the period as a whole, parties in the middle of the left-right continuum
which were also part of the government, such as Center, DDP and BVP, won most bills.
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Table 9 Percentage share of votes won
All RT1 RT2 RT3 RT4 RT5 RT6
June June Jan. June Oct. Aug.
1920– 1924– 1925– 1928– 1930– 1932–
May 1924 Dec. 1924 May 1928 Sept. 1930 July 1932 Nov. 1932
KPD 0.15 0.09 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.50
USPD 0.10 0.63
SPD 0.64 0.81 0.82 0.32 0.71 0.89 0.67
DDP 0.55 0.64 1.00 0.51 0.93
Center 0.88 0.70 0.82 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.67
BVP 0.81 0.57 1.00 0.87 0.80 0.85 0.67
DVP 0.81 0.57 1.00 0.86 0.90 0.92
DNVP 0.50 0.48 0.27 0.82 0.43 0.86 0.17
NS 0.21 0.36 0.38 0.22 0.13 0.67
Small Parties 0.69 0.50 0.73 0.69 0.66 0.07 0.67
Governing 0.84 0.70 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.93
Coalition
Bills 489 80 11 158 134 99 6
Source: calculated by author
Table 10 Variable Median
Median Parties
Left Right
Median = 1 Center
Median = 2 DDP BVP
Median = 3 SPD DVP
Median = 4 USPD DNVP
Median = 5 KPD NSDAP
As said above, the median legislator was a member of the Center Party (see Fig. 1) for
all periods, and the Center Party won most bills. Parties won bills more often the closer
they were to the Center Party. The KPD and NSDAP, the parties farthest away from the
median voter, won the fewest bills. This classical median voter behavior can more or less be
observed in all parliamentary periods.
Again, in order to see whether this effect is significant and not caused by unobserved
variables, I apply an econometric model. I calculate the variable SUCCESS, which I use as
dependent variable in a simple logit regression.4 This is a dummy variable which is equal
to one if the majority of the party members voted according to the electoral result. The
median voter model predicts that distance to the median voter should be negatively related
to success. The distance to the median legislator is measured by the ordinally scaled variable
‘Median’. Median is equal to one if the party contains the median legislator; equal to 2 if
4In total, the regression covers 4491 observations (nine parties times 489 bills).
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Table 11 Regression results for SUCCESS as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time periods Whole time period 1919–1923 1924–1929 1930–1933
Dependent variable Logit regression
Success = 1 if the party won the bill
Govdummy = 1 if party 0.342 −0.344 0.534 0.245
was in the government (3.47)** (1.47) (3.89)** (1.11)
Ai 1.955 0.908 2.659 0.795
(5.36)** (1.55) (5.27)** (0.61)
Share of seats 0.000 0.017 0.001 −0.004
(0.17) (3.64)** (0.49) (2.39)*
Enabling Act 0.306 1.155 −0.033
(1.48) (2.98)** (0.11)
Public Finances −0.080 0.285 −0.224 −0.130
(0.62) (1.01) (1.12) (0.56)
Labour −0.128 −0.644 −0.182
(0.94) (0.92) (1.22)
Tax 0.045 0.535 −0.048 −0.118
(0.33) (1.57) (0.29) (0.36)
Trade 0.074 0.036 0.188 −0.058
(0.42) (0.10) (0.60) (0.19)
Trust −0.000 0.207 −0.075 −0.086
(0.00) (0.58) (0.40) (0.39)
Median −0.700 −0.475 −0.625 −1.161
(17.22)** (3.28)** (11.74)** (10.59)**
Constant 0.052 −0.584 −0.823 2.805
(0.15) (1.00) (1.64) (2.02)*
Log pseudo-likelihood −1878.46 −353.22 −974,29 −478.985
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.042 0.16 0.31
(Mc Fadden)
Wald χ2 565.49 29.04 307.76 266.98
Observations 3403 560 1764 1079
Robust z statistics in parentheses *significant at 5% **significant at 1%
the party is the next party on the left-right continuum and so forth. Table 10 provides an
overview of the variable ‘Median’.
I further include a control variable that is equal to one if the party was a part of the
governing coalition (Govdummy). Other exogenous variables are the total agreement index
for the parliament as a whole, the number of valid votes, and dummies that control for
different topics discussed in parliament.
Table 11 shows the results. Again, the first regression includes all bills, regression 2 the
bills between 1919 and 1923, regression 3 the years 1924 to 1929 and regression 4 the years
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between 1930 and 1933. Generally, the government dummy is positive and significant if all
bills are considered. It seems that coalition agreements and higher pressure for parties in
the government to find suitable solutions mattered for winning a bill. However, this overall
effect is created by the success of the government in the years of relative stability between
1924 and 1929. The agreement index for the parties has a positive, and most of the time
significant, coefficient. The more coherently a party voted, the more likely it was to win a
vote. The share of seats is positive and significant for the time period between 1919 and 1923
and becomes negative after. The more seats a party had, the more likely it was to win votes.
The negative impact on the likelihood of winning a vote in the last period can be explained
by the extremist parties. They held a large share of seats at the end of the Republic but did
not win many votes. It seems, however, that rather than the size of a party, its position on the
left-right continuum counted in order to win bills. By contrast, the variable for the distance
to the median legislator, ‘median’, is negative and highly significant for all periods. The
closer a party was to the Center Party, of which the median legislator was a member, the
more likely it was to win a vote.
2.3 The impact of small and extremist parties and external factors
As discussed above, previous research has often emphasised the particular role of the large
number of small and extremist parties. The opportunity of a party to harm governmental de-
cisions depends on its relative size compared to the government. The larger the relative size
of a party or party group, the more influence they have in votes, provided that all politicians
or parties in a certain party group want the same outcome of a bill.
Table 5 provides the agreement index for all extremist parties (KPD, DNVP and
NSDAP) separately. All three extremist parties were very coherent. For the National So-
cialists, we can observe an interesting development. They started quite cohesively in the
second parliament, but cohesion decreased after Hitler was arrested for his attempted coup
in November 1923 and the National Socialists were officially outlawed. The parliamentary
members now changed the name of the party to ‘NS liberty movement’ and stayed in parlia-
ment in almost the same formation. Hitler was granted early release from prison in 1925, but
was not allowed to speak in public until 1928. After 1928 the party regained its high degree
of cohesion. Losing their popular ‘Führer’ as representative of the whole party seriously
harmed the National Socialists, and this can be seen in the behavior of their MPs. When
Hitler could comply with all formalities of a party leader again, he brought the party back
to its former strength.
Table 12 provides some further information on small and extremist party groups. All
extremist parties treated together as one group also show quite a high level of cohesion, and
they even manage to increase this cohesion over the years. Only in the last period cohesion is
low, because now the left-wing and right-wing extremists stopped working together against
the government. Small parties treated as one group have a relatively low agreement, which
shows they lacked common interest and voted independently of each other.
So far it seems that the influence at least of the extremist parties might have been strong,
since they were quite coherent and even gained more coherence, while they also gained
more seats. In order to determine whether the increased power of extremist parties harmed
the government and to test whether small parties had a negative impact on the success of
the government, I again apply a simple econometric model. Here, I also control for external
factors such as unemployment.
I calculated the following two dependent variables.
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Table 12 Measure of homogeneity by AIa for extremist and small parties
All RT1 RT2 RT3 RT4 RT5 RT6
June June Jan. June Oct. Aug.
1920– 1924– 1925– 1928– 1930– 1932–
May 1924 Dec. 1924 May 1928 Sept. 1930 July 1932 Nov. 1932
Small parties 0.74 0.54 0.74 0.66 0.86 0.85 0.75
(0.23) (0.21) (0.13) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.27)
Extremist parties 0.876 0.68 0.80 0.92 0.95 0.60
(0.18) (0.27) (0.19) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Number of bills 489 80 11 158 134 99 6
Source: author’s calculation
aThe reported values are the average Agreement indices for different parties and party groups for each par-
liamentary period and for all periods together. Given the strong positive correlation between the importance
of a vote and the total turnout, roll-call votes are weighted by turnout. The sample standard deviations are
reported in parenthesis
(1) GOVCOHESION, which is the agreement index for the governing coalition (see Ta-
ble 4). As this variable takes values between 0 and 1, it is censored on both sides, and I
investigate the determinants of this variable using a Tobit model.
(2) GOVSUCCESS, which is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the majority of the
governing coalition’s vote matches the electoral result (see Table 4). I estimate the de-
terminants of this variable using a simple logistic regression.
When exploring the determinants of these variables, I use the share of seats of extremist
parties, the share of seats of small parties, and the agreement indices for both groups as
indicators of the strength of the parties. I further include the number of valid votes to account
for the general importance of the bills, assuming that the general turnout is higher if the
bill is important, and the agreement index for the whole parliament as a proxy for general
atmosphere of agreement in the parliament as independent variables.
Table 13 shows the regression results for GOVCOHESION. Again, the first regression in-
cludes all bills. Regression 2 covers bills from the years between 1919 and 1923, regression
3 the years 1924 to 1929 and regression 4 the years between 1930 and 1933. The shares of
seats of extremist and small parties seem to have had a positive influence on government co-
hesion, save in the last period when the coefficients turn negative (though being significant
only in the case of small parties).
The agreement indices for both groups also had a positive influence on the coherence
of the governing coalition. It seems that neither small parties nor extremist ones disturbed
the functionality of the governing coalition. Unemployment, however, did have a negative
impact in the time period between 1924 and 1929. This result is actually counter-intuitive,
as these were the years of relative prosperity and economic calm, when unemployment was
low compared to what came later. Bills about the Treaty of Versailles and related issues
have a negative coefficient but did not significantly influence the agreement of the governing
coalition in a negative way. Furthermore the coalition was more cohesive when it came to
bills about public finances in the years between 1924 and 1929, which were debates about
how to finance the reparations and how to consolidate the household. To summarise, before
1930 neither extremist nor small parties disturbed government cohesion. External factors,
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Table 13 Regression results for GOVCOHESION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time periods Whole time period 1919–1923 1924–1929 1930–1933
Dependent variable GOVCOHESION = AI Governing Coalition
Shareothers 0.899 3.987 2.410 −2.855
(1.18) (0.86) (2.31)* (2.02)*
Shareextreme 1.620 2.740 −0.158
(3.81)** (4.86)** (0.15)
ai_extreme 0.236 0.097 0.276
(2.63)** (1.10) (1.06)
ai_others 0.206 −0.017 0.031 0.324
(2.94)** (0.10) (0.38) (2.04)*
ai_all 0.686 0.430 0.843 0.643
(6.90)** (2.64)* (7.83)** (2.50)*
Unemployment 0.002 −0.056 −0.032 0.045
(0.19) (1.14) (2.49)* (1.28)
VV 0.000 0.001 −0.001 0.001
(0.14) (1.10) (1.80) (1.19)
Enabling act 0.015 0.152 0.240
(0.11) (1.08) (1.44)
Public Finances 0.070 −0.052 0.178 −0.066
(1.26) (0.60) (3.01)** (0.58)
Labour −0.141 −0.071
(2.84)** (1.42)
Tax 0.080 0.096 0.019 0.247
(1.76) (0.86) (0.41) (1.93)
Trade 0.077 0.079 −0.093 0.280
(1.18) (0.65) (1.13) (2.48)*
Trust 0.039 −0.035 0.001 0.224
(0.74) (0.26) (0.02) (1.86)
Versailles −0.106 −0.172 −0.106 −0.209
(1.61) (1.43) (1.35) (1.66)
Constant −0.075 0.290 0.259 −0.241
(0.43) (0.95) (1.36) (0.39)
R-squared 0.179 0.166 0.315 0.182
Observations 348 77 221 127
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses *significant at 5% **significant at 1%
however, such as rising unemployment and negotiations on the Treaty of Versailles seem to
be negatively related to government cohesion, even in the years of relative stability, 1924–
1929.
A clearer picture emerges from Table 14. It presents the regression results for the logit
model where GOVSUCCESS is the dependent variable. The agreement index for the govern-
ing coalition has a positive and significant influence. On bills where the government voted
more coherently, the probability of winning was higher. ‘Ai_all’, the agreement index for
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Table 14 Regression results GOVSUCCESS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time periods Whole time period 1919–1923 1924–1929 1930–1933
Dependent variable GOVSUCCESS = 1 if the governing coalition won the vote
Shareothers 2.837 −30.883 −8.729 38.337
(0.40) (0.63) (0.54) (1.41)
Shareextreme 1.011 −11.708 10.490
(0.22) (1.39) (0.57)
ai_coalitions 1.681 5.430 2.839 1.746
(2.52)* (3.52)** (2.38)* (0.73)
ai_all 7.782 10.560 6.160 12.619
(4.86)** (3.17)** (2.45)* (3.37)**
ai_extreme 2.341 2.943 −1.597
(2.28)* (2.37)* (0.23)
ai_others −0.953 −1.161 0.090 −0.943
(1.05) (0.61) (0.08) (0.39)
Unemployment −0.205 −0.738 −0.064 −0.822
(1.59) (0.93) (0.31) (2.33)*
Enabling act −2.091 0.965 −8.258
(1.67) (0.49) (3.95)**
Public Finances −0.529 0.192 −0.611 0.644
(0.81) (0.18) (0.74) (0.41)
Labour −1.052 −0.745
(1.81) (1.08)
Tax −0.103 1.208 0.239 −1.340
(0.15) (0.67) (0.32) (0.60)
Trade 0.133 −0.549 −1.666
(0.17) (0.50) (1.24)
Trust −0.483 0.945 −0.451
(0.66) (0.65) (0.57)
Versailles −1.817 1.607 −5.549
(2.50)* (0.76) (3.18)**
Total number of votes 0.014 0.012 0.001 0.057
(2.60)** (1.23) (0.15) (2.59)**
Constant −8.301 −9.238 −3.323 −24.910
(3.59)** (2.21)* (1.13) (2.25)*
Observations 348 77 199 111
Robust z statistics in parentheses *significant at 5% **significant at 1%
the parliament as a whole, had a positive influence. In times when the parliament was quite
cohesive as a whole the government won most of the votes. The total number of votes is
a proxy for the importance of votes, because the turnout was much higher for important
votes than for less important ones. Thus the probability of winning a vote increased for
more important votes. By contrast, neither the share of seats of small parties nor the share of
extremist parties affected the probability of governments winning a vote, which means that
neither extremist nor small parties harmed the government as they increased in size.
Over the period as a whole, bills about the Treaty of Versailles were negatively related
to the probability of the government winning a bill. This result is driven by the last period.
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Other specific topics had no significant influence on government success. It is also important
to note that during the last period unemployment had a negative and significant impact on
the success of the government. Thus, increased unemployment not only influenced voting
behavior in the districts as Stogbauer (2001) showed, but also the voting behavior among
politicians in the parliament.
3 Conclusions
Why were the governments of the Weimar Republic so unstable? One line of research sug-
gests that the causes of instability can be found in the political system, the Weimar constitu-
tion and the political actors of the day. This research still dominates general public opinion,
and the political system of Germany today reflects it as well. But according to this study,
this view cannot be confirmed. Indeed it seems the parliament worked quite well:
The parties voted coherently, as the agreement index shows in Table 4. Furthermore,
political closeness and distance to the median legislator strongly determined voting behavior
and voting success. The closer two parties were on the left-right continuum, the more likely
it was that they voted together. This is shown in Table 8, which provides the results of the
Tobit regression where the dependent variable is the agreement index between two parties.
Furthermore, the closer one party was to the Center party, and thus to the median legislator,
the more likely it was that they won their votes (Tables 9, 10).
The argument that the electoral law was a cause of increased instability, as a result of too
many parties being able to enter the parliament, seems logical (see Hermens 1951; Falter
et al. 1986). Pure proportional representation indeed supports a large number of parties, none
of which hold a large share of seats, and forces politicians to build coalitions between three
or four parties. It also seems plausible that the more parties participate in the government,
the harder it is to find agreement.
This paper concludes that the share of seats held by small parties, as well as their coher-
ence, had an ambiguous effect on government cohesion and even none on the government’s
ability to win a bill. However, it does not seem that small parties harmed the ability of
the government. Thus, they did not really disrupt the political decision-making process and
hence, it is very doubtful that a 5% limit would have changed history.
Extremist parties certainly played an important role, at least in the final days of the
Weimar Republic. They gained more seats over time and also increased their cohesiveness,
but nevertheless did not manage to turn the power gained through seats into political power
before the last parliament. According to Tables 13 and 14, extremist parties did not have
a great effect on either government cohesiveness or government success. In both regres-
sions the share of extremist parties and the agreement index of the extremist parties were
used as exogenous variables. They rather had a positive influence on the functioning of the
government, but were insignificant in most specifications.
External conditions seem to have more influence. Bills about the Treaty of Versailles and
related questions harmed the success of the government in the last period between 1930 and
1933. Falter (1986) and Stogbauer (2001) have further shown that there is a strong positive
relationship between unemployment in certain constituencies and votes for the National
Socialists during general elections. The present study shows that unemployment harmed the
efficiency of the Weimar government even in periods between general elections.
Altogether, the parliament was not as dysfunctional and confused as is often suggested.
The political process followed certain theoretical patterns such as those predicted by the
median voter model. Political positions strongly influenced both voting behavior and coali-
tion formation. The closer parties were to each other ideologically the more likely they were
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to vote together. Indeed, this study is consistent with the view that the main causes of the
problems the parliament faced during the Weimar Republic are to be found outside of it.
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